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ABSTRACT
The first part of this essay argues that religious experience should not be viewed as an 
extraordinary kind of extra-sensory perception (visions, ecstasies etc) but as ‘hermeneutical’ in 
the sense that it entails an interpretation of our ordinary experience (including ordinary sense-
perception) or sometimes of particularly impressive experiences of the world and of our lives in 
the light of faith. The heritage of faith in a religious tradition provides believers with a framework 
of understanding in terms of which they can look on things with the eyes of faith. Various key 
features of this kind of interpretation are explained. The second part of the essay shows how 
various forms of spirituality are ways in which believers are trained in looking on life and the 
world with the eyes of faith and explains what this entails for the life of faith. 
THE HERMENEUTICS OF FAITH
Hermeneutics is the art of interpretation. We interpret things in order to understand what they mean. In 
this way we interpret texts, including religious texts like the Bible, in order to understand the meaning 
of what is written in these texts. Since such religious texts are the fundamental sources of religious 
traditions, the interpretation of such texts is of great importance for the faith of believers who live their 
lives in accordance with these traditions.
However, we do not only interpret texts. We also interpret our experience of the world and of our own 
lives in order to understand what they mean. In this way religious believers understand the meaning 
of their lives and the world in the light of their faith. They look on life and the world with the eyes of 
faith and this way of looking determines the meaning that life and the world has for them. Faith itself is 
therefore a form of interpretation. In this sense faith is ‘hermeneutical.’ 
A good illustration of what it means to look on life and the world with the eyes of faith can be found in 
the vision of St. Francis of Assisi as described by G.K. Chesterton:
If a man saw the world upside down, with all the trees and towers hanging head downwards as in a pool, one 
effect would be to emphasize the idea of dependence… If St. Francis had seen, in one of his strange dreams, the 
town of Assisi upside down, it need not have differed in a single detail from itself except in being entirely the 
other way around. But the point is this: that whereas to the normal eye the large masonry of its walls or the 
massive foundations of its watch-towers and its high citadel would make it seem safer and more permanent, 
the moment it was turned over the very same weight would make it seem more helpless and more in peril. It 
is but a symbol; but it happens to fit the psychological fact. St. Francis might love his little town as much as 
before, or more than before; but the nature of the love would be altered even in being increased. He might see 
and love every tile on the steep roofs or every bird on the battlements; but he would see them all in a new divine 
light of eternal danger and dependence. Instead of being merely proud of his strong city because it could not 
be moved, he would be thankful to God Almighty that it had not been dropped; he would be thankful to God 
for not dropping the whole cosmos like a vast crystal to be shattered into falling stars… He who has seen the 
whole world hanging on a hair of the mercy of God has seen the truth; we might almost say the cold truth. He 
who has seen the vision of his city upside down has seen it the right way up. 
(Chesterton 1957:74−75, 78)
This example illustrates a number of important features of the hermeneutics of faith:
1. St Francis, like believers in all theistic traditions, understood the meaning of things by looking on 
them with the eyes of faith and thus relating them to God. This has important implications for the 
way in which we are to understand the nature of religious experience. Such experience should not 
be viewed as an extraordinary kind of extra-sensory perception, but rather as ordinary experience 
(including ordinary sense perception) looked upon with the eyes of faith. St. Francis did not merely 
observe his little city lying on the hillside. With the eyes of faith he also discerned how its very 
existence is dependent on the grace of God. In this way believers understand their own lives and 
actions, the sensory world in which they live and act, as well as events in the contemporary world 
and in history, in the light of their faith. Thus I experience my own life as a life of fellowship with 
God, the sensory world as an expression of the grace and glory of God, and events in the world as 
either realizations of God’s intentions (and therefore good) or as contrary to the will of God (and 
therefore evil). So too I can look on events in history and in my own experience as providential 
or revelatory actions of God. It is only with the eyes of faith that I can experience an event as 
a manifestation of God’s providential care or can discern the revelation of God in a vision or a 
book or a sermon. Religious experience is therefore ‘hermeneutical’ in the sense that it entails an 
interpretation of our ordinary experience or sometimes of particularly impressive experiences of the 
world and of our own lives in the light of faith.
2. Looking on things with the eyes of faith involves interpreting them in the light of the heritage of faith 
handed down in a religious tradition. St. Francis did not merely become aware of the dependence 
and lack of permanence of his little city. In the light of the heritage of faith handed down to him in 
the Christian tradition, he understood this as dependence on the grace of God. The heritage of faith 
provided him with a framework of understanding in terms of which he could look on things with 
the eyes of faith.
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3. This way of looking determined the meaning that his little 
city had for him. Assisi, like the whole cosmos, is not self-
sufficient. It is dependent on the grace of God for not being 
dropped ‘like a vast crystal to be shattered into falling 
stars.’ Like the Cosmos as a whole, Assisi does not have its 
meaning in itself. It derives its meaning from the way it is 
related to God. Because it is dependent for its very existence 
on God, it is not merely good and dear to the heart of St. 
Francis. Its continued existence is now seen as a gift from 
God and thus it has a new meaning for St. Francis. In the 
words of Chesterton: ‘all goods look better when they look 
like gifts’ (Chesterton 1954:78). In the words quoted above: 
‘St. Francis might love his little town as much as before, or 
more than before; but the nature of the love would be altered 
even in being increased’.
4. The meaning of things determines the attitude that we should 
adopt towards them and the actions that are appropriate 
in relation to them. ‘Instead of being merely proud of his 
strong city because it could not be moved, he would be 
thankful to God Almighty that it had not been dropped.’ In 
this sense faith is not only a way of looking but also a way 
of living. Seeing life and the world as dependent on God 
entails a life of gratitude rather than a life of complacency 
or self-sufficiency. Religious experience is transforming. It 
not only transforms the way we look at things but also our 
attitudes and actions in relation to them. It transforms our 
lives and not only our understanding.
5. Believers claim that that their interpretation is true. It is not 
merely a useful fiction or an illusion. The eyes of faith reveal 
to them the truth about reality. ‘He who has seen the whole 
world hanging on a hair of the mercy of God has seen the 
truth; we might almost say the cold truth. He who has seen 
the vision of his city upside down has seen it the right way 
up.’ 
6. This way of looking is not shared by everybody. In a secular 
culture, many people try to understand the meaning of the 
world in secular or ‘worldly’ terms. The world derives its 
meaning from itself. Faith is an alternative way of looking 
and bestows a different meaning on the world than the 
meaning that the world has for the secularist. ‘Whereas to 
the normal [secular] eye the large masonry of its walls or the 
massive foundations of its watch-towers and its high citadel 
would make [Assisi] seem safer and more permanent, the 
moment it was turned over the very same weight would 
make it seem more helpless and more in peril.’
7. This kind of understanding does not come naturally to us. In 
the words of John Calvin, 
with regard to the knowledge of God, the knowledge of his 
paternal favour, which constitutes our salvation …, the most 
ingenious are blinder than moles. … Their discernment was 
not such as to direct them to the truth, far less to enable them 
to attain it, but resembles that of the bewildered traveller, who 
sees the flash of lightning glance far and wide for a moment, 
and then vanish into the darkness of the night, before he can 
advance a single step.
(Calvin, 2.2.18)
I think that Calvin is rather optimistic here. Most of his 
travellers today are not even aware of the fact that they 
are bewildered! Even the flash of lightning remains hidden 
from them. Seeing the world with the eyes of faith therefore 
requires spiritual training. Through lifelong spiritual 
training St. Francis had grown sensitive to the ways in which 
his own life and the world in which he lived were related 
to God. Such training enabled him to discern the presence 
of God with the eyes of faith. What is the nature of such 
spiritual training?
SPIRITUALITY
In the Bible the Holy Spirit is held to be the primary agent of 
our spirituality and our religious experience. It is only through 
enlightenment by the Spirit that we are able to see things with 
the eyes of faith. Thus in John 16:13 Jesus refers to the Holy Spirit 
as ‘the Spirit of truth’ who ‘will guide you into all the truth.’ In 
the words of John Calvin, 
It is when the Spirit, with a wondrous and special energy, forms 
the ear to hear and the mind to understand. … It thus appears that 
none can enter into the Kingdom of God save those whose minds 
have been renewed by the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit.
(Calvin, 2.2.20) 
The claim that the Spirit is the primary agent of our religious 
experience is not a simple empirical fact. It is itself the fruit of 
religious experience and the hermeneutics of faith. It is only with 
the eyes of faith that we can recognise our religious experience 
to be a gift of the Spirit and not something of our own making. 
However, this recognition does not entail that we are merely 
passive recipients of such experiences. The Spirit may be the 
primary agent of our experience, but then the primary agent 
always works through the secondary agency that we provide. 
God acts in the things we do.1 The Spirit provides the necessary 
conditions for as well as the fruits of our spiritual endeavours. 
This does not make these endeavours superfluous, however. 
It is at this point that the role of spirituality as a form of spiritual 
training comes in. Spirituality can be defined partly as a form of 
training in religious experience. In our spirituality we are trained 
to see our lives and experience of the world with the eyes of 
faith. Alhonsaari explains this point as follows, 
When praying, the believer is … repeatedly making himself see the 
world in a certain way in which everyday experiences are fitted 
into what he thinks is the proper reality; he is repeatedly bending 
his emotional life and his behaviour to conform to this reality. 
(Alhonsaari 1973:47−48)
In different forms of prayer we consciously face up to various 
aspects of our life in fellowship with God, and in this way 
train ourselves to experience life and the world in terms of this 
fellowship. Thus in petition we face up to our own dependence on 
God and so come to experience the providential actions of God 
on which we depend. As Peter Vermiglius points out, believers 
‘frequently take time for prayers, for that is what it means to 
perceive the providence of God’ (cited Ritschl (1982:282)). In 
intercession we face up to our own concern (or lack of concern) for 
the needs of others and come to experience this in terms of our 
fellowship (or lack of fellowship) with God. In penitence we come 
to look upon our own failings as sins in which our fellowship 
with God is being marred. In prayers of dedication we become 
aware of our own commitment (or lack of commitment) to doing 
God’s will. In praise we look upon the world as an expression of 
God’s goodness, holiness and glory. In thanksgiving we look upon 
our own capacities and opportunities and the fulfillment of our 
needs as gracious gifts from God. In this sense prayer is a form of 
meditation in which we consciously train ourselves to experience 
the ways in which we relate to God, to ourselves, to the world 
and to other people in our actions and attitudes in terms of our 
faith. In this way prayer is, in the words of John Drury, a ‘school 
of seeing’ (Drury 1972: Chapter 2). Of course this does not only 
apply to prayer but also more generally to liturgy and to all 
forms of spirituality. 
Spirituality and religious experience also have a life-
transforming moral dimension. They do not only determine the 
way we experience our lives and the world in which we live, 
but also our actions and attitudes in relation to our lives and 
the world. I cannot experience my life as fellowship with God 
without acting in fellowship with God. I cannot experience 
events in the world as realizations of God’s perfect intentions 
without committing myself to furthering the occurrence of such 
events, and I cannot experience events as contrary to the divine 
will without opposing them in my actions and attitudes. Thus, 
spirituality is not merely a school of seeing but also a school of 
1.For a detailed analysis of this ‘double agency’, cf. Brümmer (2006), Chapters 26 
and 31.
 H
TS
 Teologiese S
tudies/T
heological S
tudies
http://www.hts.org.za                                    HTS
Original Research
A
rticle #891
(page number not for citation purposes)
Spirituality and the hermeneutics of faith
3Vol. 66    No. 1     Page 3 of 5
doing. In the words of Alhonsaari quoted above, spirituality is 
not merely a way in which we repeatedly make ourselves ‘see the 
world in a certain way’ but also repeatedly ‘bend our emotional 
life and our behaviour’ to conform to this way of seeing. Faith is 
not merely a way of seeing but also a way of living and acting. 
Hence spirituality has not only to train believers in religious 
experience. It should also further the sanctification of their lives 
in fellowship with God. 
However, its significance goes further than merely being a means 
to this end. In spirituality believers practice their fellowship 
with God. They are not merely practicing for it. The practice of 
spirituality is not like practicing swimming strokes without going 
into the water. In the exercise of spirituality believers aim at really 
establishing, restoring and acknowledging their fellowship with 
God and bending their attitudes and actions accordingly. The 
relation between spirituality and the moral life of the believer is 
therefore an internal one in the sense that spirituality and the life of 
fellowship with God are impossible without each other. 2
Clearly then, religious belief is primarily a way of seeing as well as 
a way of living in accordance with this way of seeing. Spirituality 
is both a way of expressing and a way of training ourselves in 
this way of seeing and living. This does not mean, however, that 
religious belief has merely expressive and commissive force. On 
the contrary, it also has a constative force since the way of seeing 
it expresses and the way of life to which it commits the believer, 
entail a specific understanding of reality which is constitutive for 
both the way of seeing and the way of life. Wittgenstein argues 
that all forms of life are constituted by tacit presuppositions 
about reality.3 This also applies to the form of life of Christian 
spirituality. Thus I logically cannot claim to live a life of fellowship 
with God without assuming that God exists and is the kind of 
personal being with whom such fellowship is possible. Since 
such tacit presuppositions about God are constitutive for Christian 
spirituality, the latter becomes incoherent if these presuppositions 
are denied. R.W. Hepburn explains this point as follows. 
If I say ‘The Lord is my strength and shield’, and if I am a believer, I 
may experience feelings of exultation and be confirmed in an attitude 
of quiet confidence. If, however, I tell myself that the arousal of such 
feelings and confirming of attitude is the function of the sentence, 
that despite appearances it does not refer to a state of affairs, then the 
more I reflect on this the less I shall exult and the less appropriate 
my attitude will seem. For there was no magic in the sentence by 
virtue of which it mediated feelings and confirmed attitudes: these 
were responses to the kind of Being to whom, I trusted, the sentence 
referred: and response is possible only so long as that exists to which 
or to whom the response is made.
   (Hepburn 1957:148) 
Within the language-game of Christian spirituality, such 
constitutive presuppositions cannot be doubted or denied since 
that would entail abandoning the language-game as such. In this 
sense I agree with J.N. Findley’s contention that for the believer 
partaking in a religious form of life, 
God’s non-existence must be wholly unthinkable in any 
circumstances. There must, in short, be no conceivable alternative to 
an existence properly called ‘divine’: God must be wholly inescapable 
… whether for thought or reality.
 (Findley 1955:52)
This has important implications for the nature of religious doubt. 
Such doubt is not intellectual doubt about the truth of a hypothesis 
but existential doubt about the adequacy of a religious form of life 
and a religious way of understanding life and the world. It is not 
doubt of the mind but doubt of the heart. It does not call for an 
argument proving the truth of the hypothesis that God exists but 
rather a creative attempt to show that the heritage of a religious 
tradition can be conceptualised in a way that is adequate to the 
existential demands of life. We will return to this point below. 
2.For a more extended analysis of the relationship of prayer and spirituality to the 
moral life of believers, see Chapter 7 of Brümmer (2008).
3.For an extended discussion of this point, see Chapter 10 of Brümmer (2008). 
The constative claims about God, that are constitutive for 
Christian spirituality, do seem to raise a problem concerning the 
limits of our language. If all our human language is creaturely 
in its reference and if God is wholly other from his creatures, it 
seems to follow that anything we say about God fails to apply and 
whatever we say about God remains inadequate. This raises fears 
that if we were to relate to a God about whom we can talk, we risk 
loving a mere human construction of our wishful thoughts. That 
seems to entail that we should be apophatic about the constitutive 
presuppositions of our spirituality.4 
I agree that, since God is very unlike his creatures, our creaturely 
language is inadequate in the sense that it cannot be applied to 
God in a straightforward sense. More specifically, if Christian 
spirituality is one of personal fellowship with God, we will have 
to use personal language in order to express the constitutive 
presuppositions of this spirituality. However, since God is not like 
other people, the personal terms used to talk about God cannot 
have the same meaning that they have with reference to other 
people and our relations with them. Our language about God is 
therefore metaphorical in the sense that not all the implications 
that this language has with reference to other people can be carried 
over to our talk about God.5 Here Wittgenstein points out that, in 
order to partake in a religious form of life like that of Christian 
spirituality, we need to be introduced into the language-game 
expressing it and into the use of the metaphors and conceptual 
models that characterize it. In this connection Wittgenstein 
(1966:63, 71−72) says that we have to learn ‘the technique of using 
a picture’. This involves learning the logical limits of the language-
game and of the use of the pictures employed in it. These logical 
limits refer to the inferences, which can or cannot be validly drawn 
from the picture within the religious language-game. I master the 
technique of using the picture when I know which inferences I 
can and which I cannot draw from it. Wittgenstein illustrates 
this point in the light of the picture: ‘God’s eye sees everything.’ 
What inferences could a believer draw from this picture, and 
what inferences would be invalid within the religious language-
game? Obviously, a believer would say that, since God’s eye sees 
everything, God is aware of all that happens, not only in the world 
but also in the hearts and minds of all people: ‘Almighty God, 
unto whom all hearts be open, all desires known, and from whom 
no secrets are hidden ...’ However, Wittgenstein asks the rhetorical 
question: ‘Are eyebrows going to be talked of, in connection with 
the eye of God?’ (Wittgenstein 1996:71). Here we have clearly 
reached the logical limits of the picture. It is conceivable that a 
child might ask after the eyebrows of God. It is however part of 
the child’s introduction to the religious language-game to learn 
that such a question is out of order since it transgresses the logical 
limits of the language-game. 
Two important clues to these logical limits are the following. First 
of all, God is an infinite being and not subject to the limitations 
of creaturely existence. Thus his knowledge and power, his love 
and ability to do good, are not limited in the way ours are. The 
personal terms we use with reference to God and our relations 
with God should therefore be qualified in order to eliminate all 
implications of human finitude in God.6 Secondly, what we need 
to say about God is limited to the constitutive presuppositions 
of our spirituality. All implications of personal language, which 
are not relevant to these presuppositions, are therefore also to 
be avoided. Thus the claim that God can see into our hearts and 
know all our thoughts and desires so that we cannot keep these 
secret from him, is very relevant for our spirituality, whereas 
implications about eyebrows are not. In this sense all talk about 
God is necessarily existential in the sense that it refers to the 
constitutive presuppositions of our spirituality. This excludes all 
intellectual speculation about how God is apart from the way we 
4.On this point cf. Chapter 1 of Brümmer (2005) and Chapter 2 of Brümmer (1992).
5.For a more detailed discussion of the metaphorical nature of our God-talk, see 
Chapter 13 of Brümmer (2006). 
6.In Chapter 7 of Brümmer (1993) I explored these limits of the concept of love with 
reference to God.
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relate to God in our spirituality and in the life of faith. Here are 
the logical limits of our God-talk. Beyond this point we can only 
be agnostic and apophatic. Here God ‘dwells in unapproachable 
light’ (I Tim 6:16). Within these limits, however, we cannot afford 
to be apophatic. Our spirituality and our fellowship with God are 
human and therefore we must be able to spell out the constitutive 
presuppositions of this spirituality and of this life of fellowship 
in human terms or else our spirituality and fellowship with God 
would collapse into an incomprehensible something we know not 
what. If we were to claim that also within these limits everything we 
say about God fails anyway, then our spirituality of fellowship 
with God will fail also. Spirituality would then be reduced to mere 
vague feelings of ecstacy that cannot be expressed in words.
To be apophatic at this point leads to an unacceptable ontological 
vagueness. The more apophatically vague the constitutive 
presuppositions of our spirituality become, the more such 
spirituality is divorced from the concrete faith of a religious 
tradition. Spirituality is then reduced to a therapeutic technique by 
means of which we try to attain ecstatic experiences or a holistically 
‘healthy life’. Spirituality then becomes one of the commodities on 
offer in the market-place of spiritual goods where every individual 
can put together his or her own syncretistic cocktail of techniques 
for improving the quality of life and experience. 
Religious spirituality requires a community of believers. An 
individualised spirituality must fail in two ways. First of all, it is 
intolerably isolating, walling the self off into a kind of spiritual 
autism. It is as if the self, deprived of a real calling to community 
beyond itself, becomes the prisoner of its own anxieties and 
doubts. An individualized spirituality therefore fails to make us 
happy. However, it also fails to be a religious spirituality. As we 
have shown above, religious experience consists of seeing things 
with the eyes of faith. This presupposes faith, however, and is 
impossible when the claims of faith become apophatically vague. 
Furthermore, this faith is not something, which the individual 
believer can invent for him- or herself.  Nor is it something, 
which somehow descends upon the individual believer 
directly from heaven. It is a heritage of faith handed down by a 
community of believers who participate in a common tradition. 
Without participation in this tradition, religious experience and 
spirituality become impossible. 
It is clear that religious spirituality is based upon the heritage 
of faith mediated by the community of believers. However, this 
community remains a community of sinners who, as Augustine 
would say, is never free from concupiscentia, superbia and amor 
sui. For this reason the heritage of faith which they hand down to 
us remains a treasure in earthen vessels. It is never infallible nor 
immutable and beyond critical reappraisal and reinterpretation. 
For this reason the spirituality based on it is not immune from 
becoming pathological. Our spirituality can go wrong in two 
ways: through lack of intensity (or richness) and through lack of 
extensity (or reach). 
Our spirituality can suffer from a lack of intensity or richness 
when we treat the heritage of faith as a theory and fail to 
internalize it in our lives. Spirituality then affects our minds 
rather than our hearts. Here the words of Chesterton (1957:16) 
about St. Francis apply: ‘For this great mystic his religion was 
not a thing like a theory but a thing like a love-affair.’ Our 
spirituality loses its intensity when it is turned into a theory 
rather than a life of loving fellowship with God. The tendency to 
intellectualise the faith is characteristic for modernity in its the 
thirst for extending our objective scientific knowledge of reality. 
Modernity reduces human thought to its epistemic dimensions. 
In this way we tend to think of reality as merely the object of 
knowledge rather than the context for meaningful action, and 
we ourselves become mere epistemic subjects rather than the 
agents of meaningful living.7 Christianity then becomes for us 
7.For a more extended analysis of the epistemic reduction of modernity and its 
implications for religious belief, see Chapter 18 of Brümmer (2006). 
a theory to be studied rather than a form of life to be lived. It is 
here that we require the training of spirituality described above. 
We must learn to see ourselves and our world with the eyes of 
faith in order that within the world we might come to live the 
life of fellowship with God. Only then can spirituality regain its 
richness or intensity.
The other way in which our spirituality can go wrong is through 
lack of extensity or reach. In various historical and geographical 
situations human beings are faced with widely differing 
challenges and demands of life. It is here that our spirituality 
should have the necessary extensity or reach in order to make 
sense of all the concrete contexts of life and the ever varying 
demands with which we have to deal. Our spirituality fails if 
it is unable to connect with the variety of situations in which 
human beings find themselves. It is here that we should remind 
ourselves that the heritage of faith is not an immutable and 
finalized system of ideas, but is subject to constant change 
and reinterpretation as it is handed down in the course of the 
tradition. The heritage of faith is rather an inexhaustible fund 
of models and metaphors, stories and images, memories and 
assumptions, institutions and practices etc. from which we can 
derive and adapt what is needed to make sense of the context 
within which we live. In the words of Jesus: ‘When a teacher 
of the law has become a learner in the kingdom of Heaven, he 
is like a householder who can produce from his store things 
new and old’ (Mt13:52). The heritage of faith is an eternally 
adequate source but not an eternally immutable system. The 
heritage of a religious tradition is not a system of thought but a 
fund of metaphors and narratives, assumptions and injunctions 
that present to us various alternative ‘constructions of reality’. 
The task of the ‘teacher of the law’ is not to combine these 
into one coherent and immutably true construction of reality 
which would remain valid for all time and all situations. But 
rather creatively to develop those which are most relevant and 
adequate to the situation in which we are called to live and act. 
We should not merely repeat the heritage of the tradition without 
change in its original historical form but should sometimes 
‘invent’ new and relevant ways of understanding the heritage 
that could be incorporated coherently within the tradition. Often 
such an ‘invented’ tradition could provide the most effective and 
adequate forms of spirituality for our lives in situ. 
In order to maintain the richness and reach of our spirituality, 
theology has an essential role to fulfill as critical and innovative 
reflection on the heritage of faith. Thus theologians are called 
upon to develop proposals for conceptualizing this heritage 
in ways that are relevant and adequate in the situation where 
we are called upon to live and act, intelligible and credible for 
the community of believers today, as well as coherent and in 
recognizable continuity with the tradition in which we stand 
and from which we live.8 However, even theologians are 
fallible humans and should therefore be modest in the claims 
they make! They can never produce the final and infallible 
conceptualization of the heritage of faith. In fact there can be 
no such thing as a final and infallible conceptualization which 
would remain immutably the same in all the changing situations 
in which we humans are called upon live and act. Even the 
ontological presuppositions of our spirituality and the image we 
have of the God with whom we seek fellowship in life, cannot be 
free from reappraisal and reinterpretation. After all, if we are to 
seek fellowship with a living God who is with us and surrounds 
us with his love in all the changing circumstances in which we 
find ourselves, then God cannot be an unchanging statue of stone 
but must be a living being who manifests himself in many ways 
depending on our needs and the challenges and demands we 
have to meet in fellowship with him. Theologians can therefore 
do no more than develop proposals or conceptual designs for the 
8.For an extended discussion of the role of theology and the criteria by which the 
proposals of theology are to be judged, see Chapter 41 of Brümmer (2006).
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heritage of faith, which fulfill the criteria mentioned above. In 
the end each of us must see for him- of herself which of these 
proposals we can appropriate with integrity in the situation in 
which we live. At this level all faith and all spirituality is truly 
personal. In the words of Cantwell Smith (1978:191): ‘My faith is 
an act that I make, myself, naked before God.’ We can only pray 
that the God in whose presence we stand should inspire us by 
his Spirit that we might make this act in his truth.               
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